The power to punish contempt in the face of the court is part of the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The King v Metal Trades Employers Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (1951) 82 CLR 208 at 241–243.

Proceedings for contempt in the face or hearing of the Supreme Court are assigned to the Division of the court (or the Court of Appeal, as the case may be) in which the contempt occurred: SCA ss 48(2)(i), 53(3)(a).

SCR Pt 55 sets out the procedure to be followed by the Supreme Court in prosecuting contempts of the court or of any other court.

The District Court has power to punish contempt of court committed in the face of the court or in the hearing of the court: DCA s 199.

The Dust Diseases Tribunal has the same powers for punishing contempt of the Tribunal as are conferred on a judge of the Supreme Court for punishing contempt of a Division of the Supreme Court: s 26 of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989.

The Local Court has the same powers as the District Court in respect of contempt of court committed in the face or hearing of the court: LCA s 24(1).

There is a divergence of views (all obiter) as to the meaning of “contempt in the face of the Court … or in the hearing of the Court”.

The narrow view is that the jurisdiction is restricted to conduct seen or heard by the judge: see, for example, Fraser v R [1984] 3 NSWLR 212 per Kirby P and McHugh JA. The wider view is that it extends to conduct, without geographic boundaries, “… which is sufficiently proximate in time and space to the trial of proceedings then in progress or imminent so as to provide a present confrontation to the trial”: Court of Appeal, Registrar of the v Collins [1982] 1 NSWLR 682 at 684. Either view would appear to be open: European Asian Bank AG v Wentworth (1986) 5 NSWLR 445 per Priestley JA at 463.

Where the judge has formed the view that there has been a contempt in the face or hearing of the court, he or she should consider the following alternatives to a summary charge, bearing in mind the seriousness of the conduct and the degree of urgency involved, namely:

The summary jurisdiction of the court to punish for contempt is exceptional and should be exercised with restraint and only in a clear and serious case, in which it is necessary to act immediately: Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 CLR 162 at 173.

An important consideration for a judge in determining whether to use the summary procedure is whether the subject conduct has involved the judge personally in some way: Attorney-General v Davis and Weldon (unrep, 23/7/80, NSWCA) at 11. Giving a direction under SCR Pt 55 r 11(1) or referring a matter to the Supreme Court under DCA s 203 or LCA s 24(4) or (5) may be preferable in such cases. It will also overcome any jurisdictional doubt as to whether the conduct was in the face or hearing of the court.

A judge may alternatively refer a possible contempt to the Attorney General for consideration of contempt proceedings.

SCR Pt 55 Div 2 and s 199 of the DCA set out the procedure for dealing with a summary charge of contempt by the trial judge. The same procedures apply to the Dust Diseases Tribunal (see s 26 of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act) and to the Local Court: LCA s 24. Suggested steps for dealing with such a matter are as follows.

An appeal from summary conviction for contempt in the Supreme Court lies to the Court of Appeal under SCA s 101(5). The appropriate respondent is the King: Fraser v R at 219.

As to an appeal from a summary conviction by the District Court or a Local Court, see DCA s 201 and LCA s 24(3)(c), respectively.

A trial judge may, as an alternative to proceeding on the judge’s own motion, direct the registrar to take proceedings for criminal contempt: SCR Pt 55 r 11(1). The court may obtain advice from the Crown Solicitor before giving such a direction, see In the matter of the Compensation Court of NSW (unrep, 20/12/1985, NSWCA).

An order under SCR Pt 55 r 11(1) is executive and not judicial in character, and it has been held that there is no right for a contemnor to be heard on whether a direction should be given under r 11(1): Killen v Lane [1983] 1 NSWLR 171 at 179 (cf a referral by the District Court under DCA s 203 or by the Local Court under LCA s 24. In Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Dangerfield [2016] NSWCA 277 the Court of Appeal held that there was an obligation to afford procedural fairness in such cases, but distinguished Killen, above, as to directions under SCR Pt 55 r 11(1)). However, it is suggested that the contemnor be given such an opportunity. There is no right to make a formal application for a direction, eg by notice of motion, and no appeal is available: Killen at 177, 179.

For examples of contempt in the face of the court dealt with by way of direction under r 11(1), see Prothonotary v Wilson [1999] NSWSC 1148 (and on appeal Wilson v The Prothonotary [2000] NSWCA 23); Principal Registrar of Supreme Court of NSW v Tran (2006) 166 A Crim R 393; Prothonotary v Hall [2008] NSWSC 994; Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Coren [2017] NSWSC 754; R v WE (No 15) [2020] NSWSC 332; R v Coskun (No 4) [2022] NSWSC 696.

Under SCR Pt 55 r 6, proceedings may be commenced either by motion in the proceedings or by summons as an independent proceeding.

As to the scope of when a contempt is committed “in connection with proceedings in the Court” for the purposes of SCR Pt 55 r 6, see Long v Specifier Publications Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 545 at 564 and the cases there cited.

There appears to be no power to detain a contemnor in custody pending the commencement of proceedings by the registrar. Once proceedings have been commenced, the contemnor may be arrested and detained if “… it appears to the court that the contemnor is likely to abscond or withdraw … from the jurisdiction of the Court”: SCR Pt 55 r 10 and see Schnabel v Lui (2002) 56 NSWLR 119. As to the power to detain a contemnor following arrest, see ASIC v Michalik (No 2) (2004) 62 NSWLR 115, in which Palmer J also sets out the form of warrant used, and Huang v Liao [2021] NSWSC 1706 and [2022] NSWSC 141.

The registrar’s summons will not, of its own force, compel the attendance of the contemnor on hearing. An order may be made to compel the attendance of a contemnor on hearing: see Court of Appeal, Registrar v Ritter (1985) 34 NSWLR 641 at 651, 653; Scott v O’Riley [2007] NSWSC 560; Prothonotary of NSW v Russell Alan Jarvie [2016] NSWSC 1249. A warrant may be issued under s 97 of the CPA if the contemnor fails to attend in answer to the order: Mirembe Pty Ltd v Dangar [2009] NSWSC 94.

As an alternative to proceeding under s 199 of the DCA, or where jurisdiction under that section is not available, is doubtful or is undesirable, an apprehended contempt may be referred to the Supreme Court for determination: DCA s 203; LCA s 24(4). Such proceedings are assigned to the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court: SCA s 53(4). Such a reference may be made where:

that a person is guilty of contempt of court, whether committed in the face or hearing of the court or not.

The power to make a reference is executive and not judicial in nature. There is no right in a party or any other person to make a formal application for such a reference: cf SCR Pt 55 r 11(1); Killen v Lane, above, see [10-0110]). No appeal is available from a decision under s 203: Johnston v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 309.

Before exercising its power of referral in either form, the referring court must afford procedural fairness to a proposed contemnor: Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Dangerfield [2016] NSWCA 277; Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Chan (No 23) [2017] NSWSC 535. Failing to do so may render subsequent proceedings in the Supreme Court a nullity: Dangerfield at [49]; Chan at [64].

This is because (at least where the prospective contempt is in the face or hearing of the referring court) the referral power involves potential prejudice to the proposed contemnor, as the penalty which can be imposed by the Supreme Court is greater than that which the District Court or Local Court can impose if it decides to deal with the contempt itself: Dangerfield at [56]; Chan at [29].

Exercising the power of referral for an apparent contempt requires the court to make two decisions:

Before referring an apparent contempt, the referring court should make findings of fact in relation to the conduct and determine that it is capable of amounting to contempt: Mohareb v Palmer [2017] NSWCA 281 per Basten JA, with whom Sackville AJA agreed, at [17] ff.

The right of any other person to commence proceedings for contempt is preserved: SCR Pt 55 r 11(2). A person with an interest in proceedings will have standing to bring proceedings for contempt: European Asian Bank AG v Wentworth, above, per Kirby P at 459. Indeed, “prima facie any person can bring proceedings for contempt in relation to proceedings in a State Court”: Public Prosecutions, Director of v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1987) 7 NSWLR 588 at 595.

Contempt of court is a common law offence and there is no maximum penalty, subject to the Bill of Rights 1688: R v Smith (1991) 25 NSWLR 1 at 13 et seq; SCR Pt 55 r 13. However, where the District Court or a Local Court is exercising its jurisdiction under s 199 DCA in respect of a contempt in the face or hearing of the court, the maximum penalty which may be imposed is a fine of 20 penalty units or imprisonment for 28 days. Imprisonment is a punishment of last resort: He v Sun (2021) 104 NSWLR 518 at [68].

SCR Pt 55 is declaratory of the Supreme Court’s power of punishment and does not exhaust it: Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (No 2) (1992) 26 NSWLR 309 at 314. The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 does not apply in imposing a penalty for either civil or criminal contempt where the Court is exercising civil jurisdiction: Dowling v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW (2018) 99 NSWLR 229 at [43]–[45]. In committing a person to prison for contempt of court, the Court is operating in its civil jurisdiction: Dowling at [57].

As to matters relevant to penalty, see Maniam (No 2), above, at 314–315; Wilson v The Prothonotary, above; Jando, above, and Live Group Pty Ltd v Rabbi Ulman [2018] NSWSC 393. For a list of factors to be considered by the court on the question of an appropriate penalty, see Matthews v ASIC [2009] NSWCA 155 at [129], citing with approval the primary judge.

See also Sentencing Bench Book at [20-155].

Relevant authorities in relation to sentence for refusal to be sworn or to give evidence and in relation to reprisals against judges (in this case throwing a container of water at the presiding judge) are collected in Principal Registrar of Supreme Court of NSW v Drollet [2002] NSWSC 490.

As for matters relevant to penalty in relation to contempt by refusal to be sworn or to give evidence, see Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Gilby (unrep, 20/8/91, NSWCA) at 26–29; Principal Registrar of Supreme Court of NSW v Tran (2006) 166 A Crim R 393 (which attaches a schedule of comparable sentences for contempts of that type); Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v A [2017] NSWSC 495 and Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Ibrahim [2023] NSWSC 1275 (including consideration of contemnor’s fears for safety and mental illness).

See also “Refusal to attend on subpoena or give evidence”, Sentencing Bench Book at [20-155].