Limitations

[2-3900] Introduction

Last reviewed: May 2023

The substantive law in relation to limitation of actions is not dealt with in this section except to the extent that the topic is the subject of the CPA and the UCPR.

For a table providing the limitation period for various causes of action under the legislation of the various States and Territories, see Thomson Reuters, “Table of Limitation of Actions” at [5.10.10] in The Laws of Australia (a Thomson Reuters publication hosted on Westlaw).

For the law relating to limitations, as at the years of publication, see P Handford, Limitation of Actions: The Laws of Australia, 2022, 5th edn, Thomson Reuters, Australia.

As to the application of limitation provisions to equitable claims, see Gerace v Auzhair Supplies Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 181 at [70]–[76].

Certain limitation provisions may be affected by the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), as to which see “Trans-Tasman proceedings” at [5-3540].

[2-3910] Provisions relating to personal injury and death in the Limitation Act 1969

In relation to causes of action for personal injury or death, the Limitation Act 1969 provides for three categories of case:

Category 1: where the cause of action accrued before 1 September 1990

Category 2: where the cause of action accrued on or after 1 September 1990, but not including Category 3 cases

Category 3: where the injury or death occurred on or after 6 December 2002, but not including cases covered by the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999.

[2-3920] Provisions applicable to all three categories

Last reviewed: August 2023

For ultimate bar of 30 years, see Pt 3, Div 1, s 51.

For suspension of limitation periods while a person is under a disability, see Pt 3, Div 2, s 52.

Category 1: Where the cause of action accrued before 1 September 1990

Part 2, Div 2, ss 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Act apply. The limitation period is six years from accrual of the cause of action.

For extension of this limitation period, see Pt 3, Div 3, Subdiv 1, ss 57–60.

Category 2: Where the cause of action accrued on or after 1 September 1990, but not including Category 3 cases

Part 2, Div 2, ss 18A and 19(1)(b) apply. The limitation period is three years from accrual of the cause of action.

For extension of this limitation period, see Pt 3, Div 3, Subdiv 2 (Secondary limitation period), ss 60A–60D. The subdivision provides for a maximum five years extension if it is just and reasonable to so order. Matters to be considered are listed in s 60E. Also see Certain Lloyds Underwriters v Giannopoulos [2009] NSWCA 56.

An extension cannot be granted if proceedings had not commencing within the five year secondary limitation period: Turagadamudamu v PMP Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 397.

Further as to Categories 1 and 2: Discretionary extension for latent injury etc

For a further provision for extension in relation to Category 1 and Category 2 cases, see Pt 3, Div 3, Subdiv 3, ss 60F–60H. The extension is available where the plaintiff was unaware of the fact, nature, extent or cause of the injury, disease or impairment at the relevant time. Matters to be considered are listed in s 60I.

As to the limits of permissible cross-examination at the hearing of such an application, see Commonwealth of Australia v McLean (1996) 41 NSWLR 389. In that case, Handley and Beazley JJA at 394–395, Santow AJA agreeing, approved the review of the authorities relating to ss 60G and 60I provided in the judgment under appeal, McLean v Commonwealth of Australia (unrep, 28/6/96, NSWSC), which included the following passage:

1.

The matter or matters in s 60I(1)(a), as to which the applicant says he was unaware at the relevant time, need not be proved as the fact.

2.

Such matters need only have been claimed in the cause, subject to the following qualification.

3.

The claimed matter must not be fanciful, in the sense that there must be a serious issue to be tried.

4.

The last-mentioned requirement will ordinarily be satisfied by establishing that the plaintiff is likely to be able to adduce credible evidence at the trial which, if accepted, would establish the matter in question, or that there is a reasonable prospect that he would be able to do so.

5.

Cross-examination of witnesses on the motion concerning such matters and/or concerning the merits of the cause of action as a whole will ordinarily be inapposite, subject to the following qualification.

6.

Cross-examination of witnesses will be permitted if cross-examination might show that the plaintiff’s prospects of proving the matter or matters, as to which ignorance is alleged, and/or the cause of action as a whole are hopeless or, at least, extremely low.

7.

Proof of the applicant’s unawareness, at the relevant time or times, of one or more of the matters specified in s 60I(1)(a) (as distinct from the matters themselves) must be proved as a fact.

8.

Ordinarily, liberal, if potentially productive, cross-examination of the applicant and any other witnesses on the issue of ignorance will be allowed.

As to the cross-examination of expert witnesses on an application of this kind, Handley and Beazley JJA said in their judgment at 395, Santow AJA agreeing:

We also endorse the judge’s interlocutory ruling disallowing cross-examination of the applicant’s experts. An application for extension is not a trial, or a dress rehearsal for the trial. The court is concerned with whether there are serious questions to be tried, and once this threshold is established on the relevant issues, cross-examination or further cross-examination on those issues can serve no useful purpose. We respectfully adopt the judge’s reasons on these matters. These grounds of appeal have not been established.

Category 3: Where the injury or death occurred on or after 6 December 2002, but not including cases covered by the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999

Part 2, Div 6, ss 50A–50F apply. The limitation period is the first to expire of “the 3 year post discoverability limitation period” and “the 12 year long-stop limitation period”: s 50C. For the meaning of these terms and for provisions relating to the date on which a cause of action is discoverable, see ss 50C and 50D.

There is no provision for extension of the limitation period in Category 3 cases.

For special provisions relating to minors injured by close relatives and relating to the effect of disability on the limitation period, see ss 50E and 50F. For a detailed analysis of the provisions relating to this category, see Baker-Morrison v State of NSW (2009) 74 NSWLR 454 and State of NSW v Gillett [2012] NSWCA 83. Where a minor is involved, the relevant focus is on facts that are known or ought to be known by a “Capable Person” (which are then taken to be facts that are known or ought to be known by the minor): see Anderson v State of NSW [2023] NSWCA 160 at [44].

[2-3930] Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999

The time limit is three years except with leave of the court: s 109(1). As to the circumstances under which time does not run, see s 109(2) and Paice v Hill (2009) 75 NSWLR 468.

Leave must not be granted unless the claimant provides a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay and the total damages likely to be awarded if the claim is successful are not less than the formula in the section: s 109(3).

The requirement as to damages does not apply to a claimant who is legally incapacitated because of age or mental capacity: s 109(4).

For the meaning of a full and satisfactory explanation, see Russo v Aiello (2003) 215 CLR 643.

The Limitation Act 1969 does not apply: s 109(5).

The discretionary principles concerning applications for extension of time generally (see below) would apply.

[2-3935] Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017

The time limit is three years except with leave of the court: s 6.32(1). As to the circumstances under which time does not run, see s 6.32(2) and Paice v Hill (2009) 75 NSWLR 468.

The requirement as to damages does not apply to a claimant who is legally incapacitated because of age or mental capacity: s 6.32(4).

For the meaning of a full and satisfactory explanation, see Russo v Aiello (2003) 215 CLR 643.

The Limitation Act 1969 does not apply: s 6.32(5).

The discretionary principles concerning applications for extension of time generally (see below) would apply.

[2-3940] Workers Compensation Act 1987

The limitation period for an action for damages against an employer who has paid compensation is three years from the date of injury except by leave of the court: s 151D(2).

Again, the Limitation Act 1969 does not apply (s 151D(3)), and the discretionary principles concerning applications for extension of time generally would apply: see [2-3950].

In certain cases time may cease to run: s 151DA, Paper Coaters Pty Ltd v Jessop [2009] NSWCA 1.

[2-3950] Discretionary considerations concerning applications for extension of time generally

The following general principles were laid down in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; Holt v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128; and Itek Graphix Pty Ltd v Elliott (2002) 54 NSWLR 207.

1.: The onus is on the applicant to satisfy the court that the limitation period should be extended.
2.: The test is whether the justice of the case requires that the application be granted.
3.: A material consideration is whether a fair trial is possible by reason of the time that has elapsed since the events giving rise to the cause of action. That is to be judged at the time of the application. It is not a question of comparing the situation at the time of the application with the situation when the limitation period expired and confining attention to any additional prejudice.
4.: The length of delay and any explanation for it are relevant considerations.
5.: A respondent is prima facie prejudiced by being deprived of the protection of the limitation period.
6.: It is open to the respondent to adduce evidence of any further particular prejudice claimed.
7.: The application should be refused if the effect of granting an extension would result in significant prejudice to the respondent.
8.: The application should not be granted if the applicant, having made a deliberate decision not to commence proceedings within the limitation period, fails to give a satisfactory explanation for that conduct, notwithstanding that the respondent would suffer no prejudice from the delay.

As to what is meant by a fair trial, Priestley JA said in Holt v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128 at [79]:

… One thing seems to be clear; that is that the term is a relative one and must, in any particular case, mean a fair trial between the parties in the case in the circumstances of that particular case. Further, for a trial to be fair it need not be perfect or ideal. That degree of fairness is unattainable. Trials are constantly held in which for a variety of reasons not all relevant evidence is before the court. Time and chance will have their effect on evidence in any case, but it is not usually suggested that that effect necessarily prevents a fair trial. [Emphasis in original.]

Circumstances relevant to the grant of leave are not limited to those concerning the fairness of any trial between the applicant and the prospective defendant: Windsurf Holdings Pty Ltd v Leonard [2009] NSWCA 6 at [80]–[83]. Such circumstances may include the expiry of insurance cover: Windsurf Holdings Pty Ltd v Leonard, above, at [90].

A court exercising a discretion under a limitation law of another state or territory must exercise the discretion as far as practicable in the manner in which it is exercised in comparable cases by the courts of that state or territory: Choice of Law (Limitation Periods) Act 1993 s 6; Windsurf Holdings Pty Ltd v Leonard at [14].

[2-3960] Pleading the defence

A defence that the proceedings are statute barred must be specifically pleaded. This is so notwithstanding that the statute extinguishes the cause of action: Limitation Act 1969, s 68A; UCPR r 14.14(2) and (3).

Section 63 provides that, on the expiration of the limitation period fixed by the Act, the cause of action is extinguished. However, the effect of s 68A is that the benefit of the extinction of the cause of action is waived by the defendant if the bar is not pleaded: Commonwealth of Australia v Mewett (1995) 59 FCR 391, per Lindgren J at 421.

As to the position where the court has no jurisdiction, see Turagadamudamu v PMP Ltd (2009) 75 NSWLR 397.

Whether to decide a limitation defence separately

If a limitation defence is raised or anticipated, there is usually no doubt that the limitation period has run out and the only question, in personal injury cases, is whether the plaintiff should be granted an extension of the limitation period. However, where there are serious issues for determination under the limitation defence (such as when the plaintiff first suffered damage), a question arises as to whether to determine any such issue separately in advance of the hearing of the cause.

A separate determination of the defence, or of some issue arising under the defence, is rarely entertained but may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. For relevant considerations, see “Separate determination of questions” at [2-6100].

Whether to decide an application to extend the limitation period separately

An application for extension of the limitation period may be made in one of the following ways:

by summons before filing a statement of claim
by notice of motion filed with the statement of claim, or
by notice of motion after filing the statement of claim.

Irrespective of how the application is made, a question arises as to whether to determine the application separately or to stand the application over to be heard concurrently with the cause.

On the other hand, there may be cases where it is preferable to stand the application over to be heard in conjunction with the cause, for example:

where there is little by way of other evidence to be adduced at the hearing of the cause
where a question of credibility arises in relation to the same witness or witnesses with the potentiality of inconsistent findings of fact, or
where it would be unduly burdensome or unfairly prejudicial for the plaintiff and/or other witnesses to be examined more than once concerning facts in common between the application and the cause.

Whether to decide the issue of liability when an extension of time has been denied

In Prince Alfred College Inc v ADC [2016] HCA 37 the High Court observed at [9]:

The Court generally encourages primary judges to deal with all issues, even if one is dispositive, so that any appeal may be final.

However, in that case, for reasons set out at [111]–[119], which included prejudice to the defendant caused by the significant passage of time and destruction of evidence, the court held that the decision having been made to deny an extension of time, the issue of liability should not have been determined.

[2-3965] Cross references to related topics

Last reviewed: December 2023

Amendment, see “Limitation periods” at [2-0780] for amendment raising a cause of action which is statute barred; and “Grounds for refusal of amendment” at [2-0720] for a late application to add a limitation defence.
Cross-vesting legislation, see “Cross-vesting” at [2-1400] for cases where different limitation periods are applicable.
Consolidation of proceedings, see [2-1800] regarding the court’s power to order consolidation to preserve a party’s rights under the Limitation Act 1969.
Stay of pending proceedings, see “Legitimate personal or juridical advantage” at [2-2610] where a more generous limitation period in the domestic forum may be a relevant consideration in deciding to order a stay.
Summary disposal and strike out applications, see “Limitation defence” at [2-6920]: limitation questions should be decided in interlocutory proceedings only in the clearest of cases.
As to limitation issues in defamation proceedings, see [5-4050].
No limitation period in child abuse actions, s 6A Limitation Act: Legislative amendments which inserted s 6A into the Limitation Act 1969 so as to disapply the statute of limitations in respect of such claims manifest an intention that the passage of time is not of itself to be treated as unacceptably prejudicing a fair trial. Section 6A(6) “does not limit” the inherent, implied, or statutory jurisdiction of courts, including to prevent abuses of process however the jurisdiction is now to be exercised in the “radically new context” created by s 6A(1). Section 6A removes any requirement or even expectation of an explanation for the passing of time between the accrual of the cause of action and the commencement of the action: GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2023] HCA 32 at [40]–[45]. For a person within the relevant class created by s 6A, the mere effluxion of time and the inevitable impoverishment of the evidence which the passing of time engenders, do not mean that a trial will be unfair and attract the quality of exceptionality which is required to justify the extreme remedy of the grant of a permanent stay: GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore at [50]–[53].
See also [2-2690] Other grounds on which proceedings may be stayed. For s 6A to apply, the conduct complained of must constitute child abuse defined as (a) sexual abuse, (b) serious physical abuse, or abuse connected with (a) or (b). There is no definition in the Limitation Act of sexual abuse but on a proper construction, the reference to “sexual abuse” as part of the definition of “child abuse” in s 6A(2) means conduct which has a sexual connotation: Anderson v State of NSW [2023] NSWCA 160 at [24]–[25] (in which strip searches of two minors by police was held not to constitute child abuse for the purposes of s 6A).

[2-3970] Table of limitation provisions in NSW

Last reviewed: May 2023

Adapted with permission from P Handford, Limitation of Actions: The Laws of Australia, 2022, 5th edn, Thomson Reuters, Australia.

This table deals only with the limitation periods of general application set out in the Limitation Act 1969 and related legislation of New South Wales or the Commonwealth. There are other limitation rules which are set out in other statutes, with which the service does not deal. Unless otherwise stated, references to sections are references to the Limitation Act 1969.

References in square brackets are references to the paragraphs from Limitation of Actions: The Laws of Australia (a Thomson Reuters publication hosted on Westlaw) in which the limitation provisions in question are discussed.

Limitation periods run from the time when the cause of action accrues, unless some other rule is stated. The rules dealing with when a cause of action accrues are discussed in the paragraphs referred to. “P” refers to the plaintiff and “D” refers to the defendant.

CAUSE OF ACTION	LIMITATION PERIOD	EXTENSION PROVISION
CONTRACT AND QUASI-CONTRACT
Contract (except actions founded on a deed)	6 years: s 14(1)(a) See [5.10.580]
Actions for seamen’s wages	6 years: s 22(1), s 14(1)(a) See [5.10.660]
Actions on a specialty or deed	12 years: s 16 See [5.10.670]
Quasi-contract	6 years: s 14(1)(a) See [5.10.680]
Action arising by virtue of frustration of contract	6 years from date of frustration: s 14A See [5.10.680]
Actions for an account	6 years: s 15 See [5.10.2070]
TORT
Tort (other than specific cases set out below)	6 years: s 14(1)(b) See [5.10.700]
Trespass	6 years: s 14(1)(b) (general tort limitation period) See [5.10.700], [5.10.720]
Second or subsequent conversion	6 years from accrual of original cause of action: s 21 See [5.10.730]
Actions for breach of statutory duty	6 years: s 14(1)(b) See [5.10.700]
Defamation: Causes of action accruing before 1 January 2006	1 year from publication: s 14B(3) (now repealed) See [5.10.830]	3 years from publication, if unreasonable for P to have commenced action within 1 year from publication: s 56A (as in force prior to amendment) See [5.10.830]
Defamation: Causes of action accruing on or after 1 January 2006	1 year from publication: s 14B (subject to transitional provisions in Sch 5 Pt 2 cl 7(2)). See [5.10.841]–[5.10.842]	3 years from publication, if unreasonable for P to have commenced action within limitation period: s 56A(2) See [5.10.841]–[5.10.842]
Contribution and indemnity between joint tortfeasors	2 years from date action accrues to tortfeasor, or 4 years from expiry of limitation period for principal cause of action, whichever period expires first: s 26(1) See [5.10.2120]
PERSONAL INJURY
Personal injury: Causes of action accruing before 1 September 1990	6 years: s 14(1)(b) (general tort limitation period) See [5.10.1050]	1 year after material facts of decisive character within P’s means of knowledge: s 58(2) See [5.10.1050] In cases of latent injury, disease or impairment: Any period, if just and reasonable: s 60G, Schedule 5 Pt 1 cl 4 See [5.10.1080]
Personal injury: Causes of action accruing between 1 September 1990 and 5 December 2002	3 years: s 18A See [5.10.1060]	An additional 5 years, if just and reasonable: s 60C See [5.10.1070] In cases of latent injury, disease or impairment: Any period, if just and reasonable: s 60G, Schedule 5 Pt 1 cl 4 See [5.10.1080]
Personal injury: Causes of action accruing on or after 6 December 2002	3 years from date of discoverability or 12 years from act or omission, whichever expires first: s 50C See [5.10.1090]	12 year period can be extended for maximum of 3 years from date of discoverability, but 3 year period cannot be extended: s 62A See [5.10.1100] There is a special provision for minors: s 62D See [5.10.2430]
Dust-related conditions	No limitation period: Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 s 12A See [5.10.1110]
Child abuse	No limitation period where death or personal injury results from abuse of a child: s 6A (has retrospective effect)
Road accidents	See [5.10.1050]–[5.10.1060]
Work accidents	See [5.10.1050]–[5.10.1060]
Wrongful death actions: Causes of action accruing before 1 September 1990	6 years from death: s 19(1)(a) See [5.10.1370]	Where material facts of decisive character not within deceased’s means of knowledge more than 1 year prior to death, court can disregard limitation period: s 60(2) See [5.10.1400] In cases of latent injury, disease or impairment: Any period, if just and reasonable: Schedule 5 Pt 1 cl 4
Wrongful death actions: Causes of action accruing between 1 September 1990 and 5 December 2002	3 years from death: s 19(1)(b) See [5.10.1370]	5 years, if just and reasonable: s 60D(2) See [5.10.1400] In cases of latent injury, disease or impairment: Any period, if just and reasonable: s 60H(2) See [5.10.1400]
Wrongful death actions: Causes of action accruing on or after 6 December 2002	3 years from date of discoverability or 12 years from act or omission, whichever expires first: s 50C(1) See [5.10.1370] But no limitation period for child abuse actions: s 6A(5)(a) See [5.10.1370]	12-year period can be extended for maximum of 3 years from date of discoverability, but 3-year period cannot be extended: s 62A(2) See [5.10.1400]
Personal injury action surviving for benefit of estate of deceased person: Causes of action accruing before 1 September 1990	6 years: s 14(1)(b) (general tort limitation period) See [5.10.2210]	1 year after material facts of decisive character within P’s means of knowledge: s 59(2) See [5.10.2220]
Personal injury action surviving for benefit of estate of deceased person: Causes of action accruing between 1 September 1990 and 5 December 2002	3 years: s 18A(2) See [5.10.2210]	Up to 5 years if just and reasonable: s 60C(2) See [5.10.2220]
Personal injury action surviving for benefit of estate of deceased person: Causes of action accruing on or after 6 December 2002	3 years from date of discoverability or 12 years from act or omission, whichever expires first: s 50C See [5.10.2210]	12-year period can be extended for maximum of 3 years from date of discoverability, but 3-year period cannot be extended: s 62A(2) See [5.10.2220]
Cause of action in tort surviving against estate of deceased person	Period same as if deceased had survived See [5.10.2210]
PROPERTY DAMAGE AND ECONOMIC LOSS
Action for negligence for property damage or economic loss	6 years: s 14(1)(b) (general tort limitation period) See [5.10.700] See also [5.10.790]
Action in respect of defective building work	10 years from completion: Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 6.20(1) See [5.10.790]
RELATED ACTIONS
Actions on a judgment	12 years from date judgment became enforceable: s 17(1) See [5.10.2170]
Actions to enforce an arbitral award (where agreement to arbitrate not under seal)	6 years: s 20(2)(b) Action accrues when default in observance of award first occurs: s 20(3) See [5.10.2180]
Actions to enforce an arbitral award (where agreement to arbitrate made under seal)	12 years: s 20(2)(a) Action accrues when default in observance of award first occurs: s 20(3) See [5.10.2180]
Actions to enforce a recognisance	6 years: s 14(1)(c) See [5.10.2190]
Actions to recover a penalty or forfeiture or other sum recoverable by virtue of an enactment	2 years: s 18(1) See [5.10.2200]
Actions to recover sum recoverable by virtue of an enactment (other than penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture)	6 years: s 14(1)(d) See [5.10.2200]
Actions to recover arrears of income	6 years: s 24(1) See [5.10.2150]
LAND
Actions to recover land	12 years: s 27(2) See [5.10.1560]
Action to recover land by holder of future interest to recover land	12 years: s 27(2) Action accrues when P becomes entitled to immediate possession, if no person in possession under interest claimed: s 31 See [5.10.1640]
Actions by tenant entail	Entailed interests abolished See [5.10.1650]
Actions by the Crown to recover land	30 years: s 27(1) See [5.10.1680]
Action to recover land brought by person other than Crown where right first accrued to Crown	At any time before expiration of Crown limitation period, or 12 years from date when right of action accrued to person other than Crown, whichever period first expires: s 27(4) See [5.10.1680]
Actions to recover arrears of rent, or damages in respect of arrears	6 years: s 24(1) See [5.10.1720]
MORTGAGES
Actions by mortgagor to redeem (land and personalty)	12 years from date mortgagee last went into possession, or last received payment of principal or interest: s 41 See [5.10.1740]
Actions by mortgagee to recover possession (land and personalty)	12 years: s 42(1)(b) See [5.10.1750]
Actions by mortgagee to foreclose (land and personalty)	12 years: s 42(1)(c) See [5.10.1760]
Actions by mortgagee to recover principal money (land and personalty)	12 years: s 42(1)(a) See [5.10.1770]
Actions by mortgagee to recover interest	6 years from accrual (or date prior mortgagee discontinues possession) or when limitation period for action to recover principal expires, whichever period first expires: s 43(1) See [5.10.1780]
TRUSTS
Actions by a beneficiary against a trustee to recover trust property, or for breach of trust	6 years: s 48(a) See [5.10.1790]
Actions in respect of fraud or fraudulent breach of trust, and actions to recover trust property converted by a trustee	12 years from date of discoverability, or expiration of any other applicable limitation period under Limitation Act, whichever is later: s 47(1) See [5.10.1810]
DECEASED ESTATES
Actions claiming the personal estate of the deceased, under will or on intestacy	6 years: s 48 (breach of trust limitation period) See [5.10.1820]
Actions to recover arrears of interest in respect of legacy, or damages in respect of arrears	6 years: s 24(1) See [5.10.1820]
ADMIRALTY ACTIONS
Maritime claims generally	Limitation period that would have been applicable if proceeding brought otherwise than under Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth), or 3 years from when cause of action arose: Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) s 37(1) See [5.10.2080]	May be extended where court otherwise has no power to extend limitation period in respect of maritime claim, but has power to extend limitation period in respect of claim of same kind: Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) s 37(3) See [5.10.2080]
Actions to enforce claim or lien against ship or shipowner in respect of damage to another ship, its cargo or freight, any property on board, or loss of life or personal injury suffered by anyone on board	2 years from date of damage: s 22(2) See [5.10.2090]	Can be extended to such extent as court thinks fit: s 22(4) See [5.10.2090]
Actions to enforce claim or lien in respect of salvage services	2 years from date services rendered: s 22(3) See [5.10.2090]	Can be extended to such extent as court thinks fit: s 22(4) See [5.10.2090]
MISCELLANEOUS
Arbitrations	After expiration of limitation period fixed by Limitation Act for cause of action in respect of same matter: s 70(2) See [5.10.2110]	In stated circumstances, court can order that time between commencement of arbitration and making of order should not count in reckoning of limitation period: s 73 [5.10.2110]
Actions to recover tax	12 months after tax paid: Recovery of Imposts Act 1963 s 2(1)(b) See [5.10.2240]
ULTIMATE BAR
Ultimate bar	30 years from date limitation period runs (in all cases except wrongful death or personal injury where the court has extended the limitation period): s 51(1) See [5.10.2350]

Legislation

Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) s 37
Choice of Law (Limitation Periods) Act 1993 s 6
Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 s 12A
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 6.20
Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) ss 6A, 14, 14A, 14B, 15, 16, 17, 18, 18A, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48, 50A–50F, 51, 52, 57–60, 60A–60D, 60E, 60F–60H, 60G, 60I, 63, 68A, 70, 73
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 s 109(1), (3), (5)
Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 s 6.32(1)–(5)
Recovery of Imposts Act 1963 s 2(1)(b)
Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth)
Workers Compensation Act 1987 s 151D(2), (3)

Rules

UCPR r 14.14(2), (3)

Further References

P Handford, Limitation of Actions: The Laws of Australia, 2022, 5th edn, Thomson Reuters, Australia