The state of mind in which murder is committed is directly relevant to determining the objective seriousness of the crime: Charbaji v R [2019] NSWCCA 28 at [180]. However, while intent to kill generally tends to greater objective seriousness than an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, the question of intent is not the only relevant consideration: Charbaji v R at [180]; Apps v R [2006] NSWCCA 290 at [49]; Versluys v R [2008] NSWCCA 76 at [32]. There may be circumstances where an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm reflects similar criminality to cases involving an intention to kill: R v Nelson (unrep, 25/6/96, NSWCCA); R v Wilson [2005] NSWCCA 112 at [22]; R v Hillsley [2006] NSWCCA 312 at [16]–[17].

However, the existence of particular features is not determinative of where a particular offence of murder might sit within the range of objective seriousness. While in Nguyen v R [2007] NSWCCA 363 Smart AJ had said at [143] “An intention to kill and premeditation are usual elements in a murder of midrange objective seriousness”, subsequently in Park v R [2019] NSWCCA 105, RA Hulme J observed that that statement had been misconstrued and that when taken in context indicated that those two features were not unusual elements of such an offence: at [52]–[53]; see also Harrison J at [23].

In Park v R the court reviewed a number of murder cases at [24]–[33] and concluded there was no reliable relationship between an assessment of any particular degree of objective seriousness and the sentence imposed but that factors present in cases described as significantly above the mid-range might include gratuitous cruelty, contract killings, causing death in a way likely to cause excruciating pain or agony or particularly doing so in order that the process of dying occurs over an extended period or where the victim might have had undue time to contemplate the terror of what was coming: at [36].

In R v Wilson [2005] NSWCCA 112, where the sentencing judge found that the basis for murder was an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, as opposed to constructive murder, it was said at [22] that “[a]n offence of murder on some other basis than intent to kill is not necessarily of less culpability for that reason, and attention must be directed to the actual circumstances.”

In R v Holton [2004] NSWCCA 214, a case in which the appellant’s vehicle collided with a police officer while the officer was in the process of deploying road spikes, the prosecution relied on reckless indifference to human life as the basis for liability for murder. The Crown appealed against the sentence of 16 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 12 years. Grove J observed at [59] (cf Hulme J who would have increased the sentence at [120]):

The need to consider each case on its own facts was recognised by the Victorian Court of Criminal appeal in R v Aiton (unrep, 5/10/93, VSC) referred to with approval by Gleeson CJ in R v Ainsworth (unrep, 6/12/94, NSWCCA).

The common law offence of felony murder has been replaced by the fourth category of murder as set out in s 18(1)(a) Crimes Act 1900. The term “constructive murder” should generally be used in preference to “felony murder” to avoid confusion with the common law: R v Spathis; R v Patsalis [2001] NSWCCA 476 at [209].

In R v Jacobs [2004] NSWCCA 462 at [332] Wood CJ at CL said:

Aslett v R [2006] NSWCCA 360 was a case of constructive murder, the foundational crime being one of robbery armed with a dangerous weapon. The court observed at [21] that “[a] murder committed in these circumstances may be as serious as a murder committed with intent to kill”, but on appeal reduced a life sentence to a non-parole period of 28 years with an additional term of six years.

In R v Mills (unrep, 3/4/95, NSWCCA), Cole JA said:

Gleeson CJ agreed:

While courts have generally found the moral culpability of an offender who commits a “mercy killing” to be less than other forms of intentional murder, a sentencing judge must still bear in mind that the offence involves deliberately taking a human life, the maximum penalty for which is life imprisonment with a standard non-parole period of 20 years. Unlawful homicide, in whatever form, has always been recognised as a most serious crime and protecting human life and personal safety is a primary objective of the criminal justice system: Cooper v R [2021] NSWCCA 65 at [83], [86]; R v Edwards (1996) 90 A Crim R 150 at 51. The court in Cooper v R, at [84], applied the observations of Hamill J at [7]–[8] in R v Dowdle [2018] NSWSC 240. His Honour said at [8] in respect of a manslaughter mercy killing:

For offences of murder (other than those set out below) committed after 1 February 2003, there is a standard non-parole period of 20 years. The standard non-parole period does not apply to matters for which a life sentence is imposed: s 54D(1)(a) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. A list of appeal cases and summaries involving murder, which were decided following Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120 is accessible via “SNPP Appeals” on the JIRS website. For a general discussion on standard non-parole periods see Standard non-parole period offences — Pt 4 Div 1A at [7-890]ff.

A standard non-parole period of 25 years is prescribed for murders committed after 1 February 2003 “where the victim was a police officer, emergency services worker, correctional officer, judicial officer, health worker, teacher, community worker, or other public official, exercising public or community functions and the offence arose because of the victim’s occupation”: item 1A, Table of standard non-parole periods, s 54D(2), Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

Even before the introduction and application of the above standard non-parole period, it was recognised that an offender’s culpability may be aggravated by the fact that the victim was a police officer: R v Adam [1999] NSWSC 144 at [44]–[46]; R v Penisini [2004] NSWCCA 339 at [20]; R v Holton [2004] NSWCCA 214 at [100], [125]. In R v Rees (unrep, 22/9/95, NSWCCA), Gleeson CJ said that the deliberate killing of a police officer warrants “severe retribution.”

A standard non-parole period of 25 years is prescribed for murder cases where the victim is a child under the age of 18 years: item 1B, Table of standard non-parole periods, s 54D(2), Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. Unlike other categories of murder with a standard non-parole period, this item applies “to the determination of a sentence whenever committed” (subject to the conviction being recorded or a plea being entered before 1 January 2008): Sch 2, Pt 17, cl 57, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

The murder of a child has always been considered a crime of extreme gravity, whether committed by a stranger or family member. The courts have recognised the enhanced culpability of an offender who is motivated to kill their child in order to punish the other parent. In R v Fraser [2005] NSWCCA 77, which involved the murder of the offender’s three children during an access visit, Grove J said at [41]–[42]:

See generally the discussion with regard to worst cases at [10-005] Cases that attract the maximum.

Under the common law, the maximum penalty of life imprisonment is intended for cases that are so grave as to warrant the maximum prescribed penalty: The Queen v Kilic (2016) 259 CLR 256 at [18].

Section 61(1) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provides:

In R v Harris (2000) 50 NSWLR 409 (R v Harris (CCA)) at [87]–[88], [90] the court held that s 61(1) effectively restates the common law concerning the imposition of life sentences for murder.

A convenient summary of the legislative history of s 61(1) and the relevant caselaw can be found in Rogerson v R [2021] NSWCCA 160 at [616]–[637]. See also the summary of the relevant principles in Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 at [23]. The proper approach to s 61(1) is that stated in R v Harris [2000] NSWCCA 285 at [76]–[86] (R v Harris (Bell J)) and R v Harris (CCA): Rogerson v R at [636].

The burden is on the Crown to establish beyond reasonable doubt that a case falls within s 61(1): R v Merritt (2004) 59 NSWLR 557 at [35]. However, not all of the factors which would lead to a conclusion that s 61(1) is applicable must be established beyond reasonable doubt: Adanguidi v R [2006] NSWCCA 404 at [55]. It is the combined effect of the findings concerning the indicia in s 61(1) (that is, the interest in (i) retribution (ii) punishment (iii) community protection, and (iv) deterrence) that must be considered: R v Merritt at [52], [54].

Section 61 is subject to s 21(1) of the same Act (see s 61(3)), which provides that, even though liable to a sentence of life imprisonment, an offender may receive a determinate sentence. This necessarily involves a two-stage process when determining whether a life sentence is appropriate (see R v Valera [2002] NSWCCA 50 at [8] and R v Merritt (2004) 59 NSWLR 557 at [37]), but one that is different to the staged approach to sentencing disavowed in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 and Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120: Rogerson v R at [636]; Dean v R [2015] NSWCCA 307 at [96].

In applying s 61(1), the court assesses first, whether the offence warrants a life sentence because of the circumstances surrounding or causally connected to the offence, and second, whether a lesser sentence is warranted because of other matters such as remorse, confessions, pleas of guilty and prospects of rehabilitation: Rogerson v R at [626]–[629], [635]–[636]; R v Harris (Bell J) at [84]–[85]; R v Harris (CCA) (2000) 50 NSWLR 409 at [60]; CC v R [2021] NSWCCA 71 at [81]–[83].

The first stage involves considering the requirements of s 61(1), which focuses on the offender’s “level of culpability”. This directs attention to objective factors, such as the objective seriousness of the offence, and subjective factors with a causative influence on the offender’s culpability: see R v Harris (Bell J) at [84]–[87]; Rogerson v R at [636]. The latter may include the offender’s background and any mental health impairment, disorder or incapacity with a causative influence on their level of culpability but not consideration of remorse, admissions, whether or not there was a guilty plea or the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation: R v Harris (Bell J) at [84]–[85]; Rogerson v R at [623]–[625].

In CC v R, Adamson J at [81]–[83] described the distinction drawn in R v Harris (Bell J) as one between factors relevant to the offender’s level of culpability and factors relevant to the sentence to be imposed, observing that there was a degree of overlap between the two, but that “the instinctive synthesis required as part of the exercise of the sentencing discretion” involved considering all relevant matters, not just those affecting the offender’s culpability in the commission of the offence. This approach was subsequently approved in Rogerson v R at [635], but as to the use of the descriptors “objective” and “subjective” in relation to the two-stage process the court said at [636]:

The second, discretionary, stage under s 21(1) is deciding whether a lesser sentence is warranted. This invites consideration of subjective matters such as remorse, confessions, pleas of guilty and their timing, and the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation: Rogerson v R at [626]–[629], [635]–[636]; R v Harris (CCA) at [60]; R v Harris (Bell J) at [84]–[85].

R v Warwick (No 94) [2020] NSWSC 1168 and Rogerson v R are examples of cases where s 61(1) was found to be satisfied: see R v Warwick (No 94) at [18], [94]–[95]; Rogerson v R at [638]–[642]; R v Rogerson; R v McNamara (No 57) [2016] NSWSC 1207 at [230]–[242].

The absence of criminal antecedents does not render an offender immune to the maximum penalty, either under s 61(1) (for example, Adanguidi v R [2006] NSWCCA 404 at [34]: Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292), or the common law (for example, R v Ngo [2001] NSWSC 1021).

A life sentence may also be imposed either at common law or under s 61(1) even if the offender pleads guilty: R v Baker (unrep, 20/9/95, NSWCCA); R v Garforth (unrep, 23/5/94, NSWCCA) (both sentenced prior to the introduction of the predecessor to s 61(1)); R v Coulter [2005] NSWSC 101 at [56]–[57]; Knight v R at [37]; R v Miles [2002] NSWCCA 276 at [213].

Section 61(1) does not apply to offenders under the age of 18 years (s 61(6)), although arguably the common law still applies to such offenders. Life sentences have been imposed on young adults in Gonzales v R [2007] NSWCCA 321 (20 years at the time of offence); and R v Valera [2002] NSWCCA 50 (19 years). These were cases to which s 61(1) applied. In R v Leonard (unrep, 7/12/98, NSWCCA), a case in which the common law applied, McInerney J said:

Both at common law and in the application of s 61(1), life sentences have been imposed regardless of whether there is some prospect of rehabilitation. In R v Baker (unrep, 20/9/95, NSWCCA), Barr AJ rejected the proposition that a life sentence should never be imposed where there is some prospect of rehabilitation. Similarly, in R v Garforth (unrep, 23/5/94, NSWCCA), the court said:

These cases concerned sentences imposed prior to the introduction of the predecessor to s 61. Similar observations were made in Knight v R at [23], a case to which s 61 applied.

The Crimes Amendment (Murder of Police Officers) Act 2011 amended the Crimes Act 1900 by inserting s 19B. Section 19B requires a court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment where a police officer is murdered in the course of executing their duty; or as a consequence of, or in retaliation for, actions undertaken by any police officer in the execution of their duty where the person knew or ought to have known that the person killed was a police officer. The person must have intended to kill the police officer, or have been involved in criminal activity that risked serious harm to police officers. Section 19B applies to offences committed after 23 June 2011: s 19B(7).

Section 19B was applied in R v Jacobs (No 9) [2013] NSWSC 1470.

One of the factors that might justify the imposition of a life sentence is where the offender commits multiple murders: R v Baker (unrep, 20/9/95, NSWCCA) per Gleeson CJ.

It is permissible to take the fact that there are multiple murders into account in determining whether an offence should attract the maximum: see R v Harris (2000) 50 NSWLR 409 at [94]–[95]; Decision Restricted [2005] NSWCCA 4 at [93]; Adanguidi v R [2006] NSWCCA 404 at [32]. However, as McClellan CJ at CL said in Aslett v R [2006] NSWCCA 360 at [25]:

The difficulty identified in Aslett v R does not arise in the context of multiple murders committed as part of a single episode of criminality. In such a case, the objective criminality of one offence is capable of informing the objective criminality of another, and the court may have regard to the whole of the conduct in determining the level of culpability involved in the commission of each offence: Adanguidi v R at [32].

In R v Baartman (unrep, 7/12/94, NSWSC), Abadee J said that the “[p]lanned and deliberate shooting of another human being for no better reason than economic gain is surely to be regarded by a civilised society as being a very serious crime.”

Similar comments were made by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Kalajzich (unrep, 13/4/89, NSWCCA); and R v Lo [2003] NSWCCA 313 at [16], where it was also held that the gravity of the offence was enhanced by the fact the murder was motivated by a desire to prevent the victim from giving evidence in criminal proceedings.

In R v Crofts (unrep, 6/12/96, NSWSC) Grove J said, “A deliberate killing for payment would prima facie find its place in the worst category of case with a potential for imposition of the maximum penalty of penal servitude for life.” In R v Kalajzich (unrep, 16/5/97, NSWSC), Hunt CJ at CL endorsed this statement, but added:

For a contract killing to which the standard non-parole period provisions applied, see R v Willard [2005] NSWSC 402 at [28].

The mutilation of the deceased’s body can be taken into account as an aggravating factor in assessing the seriousness of the offence: R v Knight [2006] NSWCCA 292 at [28]–[29]; R v Yeo [2003] NSWSC 315 at [36]; DPP v England [1999] VSCA 95 at [35], [37], [41].

In R v Garforth (unrep, 23/5/94, NSWCCA), the court held that the sentencing judge was entitled to take the abduction and sexual assault of the victim into account in determining whether the offence fell within the worst case category (as that concept was understood prior to The Queen v Kilic (2016) 259 CLR 256). In R v Hillsley [2006] NSWCCA 312 at [20]–[22], the court held that the sexual assault of the deceased’s child, which was part of the motive for the killing of the deceased, was rightly considered in assessing the objective gravity of the murder.

In TL v R [2020] NSWCCA 265 at [333]–[335], the court found it was not an error to take into account as part of the circumstances of the offending, evidence of previous assaults as a factor increasing the objective seriousness of the offence.

In Charbaji v R [2019] NSWCCA 28, the court found it was not an error to assess a murder, committed with an intent to kill, as being well above the mid-range and approaching the worst case, in circumstances where the offence was brutal, cruel and callous and involved torturing the deceased over a prolonged period of time: at [182]–[184].

The harm caused by an offence can be taken into account in different ways. Part 3, Div 2 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 empowers a court to receive a victim impact statement from the victim of an offence (defined in s 26 as either a “primary” or “family” victim). See further Victim impact statements of family victims at [12-838].

Another situation identified in R v Lewis [2001] NSWCCA 448 at [67], is where the offender knowingly deprives a child or children of their parent. In that case, Hodgson JA said the degree of harm an offender knows will be caused by the offence is highly relevant to their moral culpability and that:

However, there is no requirement to find an intention to kill; this principle may also apply where the offender intends to inflict grievous bodily harm: Sheiles v R [2018] NSWCCA 285 at [40]. In Sheiles v R, the offender stabbed the deceased intending to inflict grievous bodily harm but this did not exclude her also being aware of the real possibility or risk of causing death by that action. She was well aware of the likely effect of the deceased’s death on his daughter and terminally ill wife, and that was relevant to her moral culpability: at [39]–[42].

An aggravating factor under s 21A(2)(g) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 is where the “injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was substantial”. In Aslett v R [2006] NSWCCA 360 at [37] it was said that s 21A(2)(g) is not limited to the harm suffered by the primary victim.

Dangerousness alone is not sufficient to justify imposing the maximum penalty for murder: see R v Hillsley [2006] NSWCCA 312 at [24]. It is impermissible to increase an otherwise appropriate sentence merely to achieve preventative detention: Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 473, 474. An offender’s future dangerousness is, however, a highly relevant factor. In R v Harrison (unrep, 20/2/91, NSWCCA) it was held that “a sentencing judge is not required to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a prisoner will in fact re-offend in the future. It is sufficient if a risk of re-offending be established by the Crown.” This was confirmed in R v Robinson [2002] NSWCCA 359 at [48]–[50]; and R v SLD (2003) 58 NSWLR 589 at [40]. In addition to any other evidence before the court, the sentencing judge is entitled to take the circumstances of the offence into account in determining the question of future dangerousness: R v Garforth (unrep, 23/5/95, NSWCCA). In that case it was also said:

The High Court discussed the issue of predicting dangerousness in Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (2004) 223 CLR 575 at [12], [124]–[125].

Some other factors which have been identified in murder cases as aggravating the offence or indicating that it attracts the maximum include:

In R v Hore; R v Fyffe [2005] NSWCCA 3 the applicants sought leave to appeal against life sentences imposed for the murder of a fellow prison inmate. In his sentencing remarks with respect to each offender, Barr J said (R v Hore [2002] NSWSC 749 at [41]; R v Fyffe [2002] NSWSC 751 at [33]):

On appeal it was held that the sentencing judge did not err in treating the fact that the murder occurred in a minimum security prison as a factor warranting condign punishment: R v Hore; R v Fyffe, above, at [351].

An accessory before the fact to murder is liable to the same maximum penalty as for murder: s 346 Crimes Act 1900. It has been held that the standard non-parole period provisions for murder do not apply to accessories before the fact: Aoun v R [2007] NSWCCA 292 at [27]. As of 15 November 2007, s 346 was amended to provide that an accessory before the fact to murder is liable to the “same punishment to which the person would have been liable had the person been the principal offender” (previously expressed as the “same punishment as the principal offender”): Criminal Legislation Amendment Act 2007, Sch 3[5].

An accessory is not necessarily less culpable than a principal, and in some cases may be more so, especially where the accessory instigates and plans the murder: R v Norman; R v Oliveri [2007] NSWSC 142 at [30].

An accessory after the fact to murder is liable to a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment: s 349(1) Crimes Act 1900. There is a wide variation in the possible degrees of culpability involved in the offence: R v Farroukh and Farroukh (unrep, 29/3/96, NSWCCA). General deterrence and retribution are important considerations in sentencing: R v Ward [2004] NSWSC 420 at [51].

In R v Quach [2002] NSWSC 1205 at [11], Simpson J held that “assistance in the disposal of a body after a murder [as opposed to, for example, assisting the principal to clean him/herself up] takes a crime of this kind into the upper echelons of the offence against s 349”.

Accessories after the fact are viewed more seriously where the offender has a personal interest in the criminal enterprise, or became involved through their association with criminal elements: R v Farroukh and Farroukh. Such cases are to be contrasted with situations thrust upon accessories without any prior warning and not of their own making. Where an accessory provides assistance after being thrust into a situation without warning, but the assistance continues for a period of time, it should no longer be regarded as a “spur-of-the-moment” reaction: R v Farroukh and Farroukh; R v Walsh; R v Sharp [2004] NSWSC 111 at [48]; see also R v Ward [2004] NSWSC 420 at [48]; and R v Quach at [11].

On the other hand, accessories who have no personal relationship with the principal may be viewed more seriously than accessories who provided assistance out of a sense of emotional attachment or misguided loyalty: R v Dileski [2002] NSWCCA 345 at [17], although that is not to say that an offence which is committed out of a misguided sense of loyalty will necessarily attract a lenient penalty, as “[s]uch offending commonly represents a choice to place the interests of the principal offender ahead of the victim and/or the public generally”: R v Ward [2004] NSWSC 420 at [49].

Only assistance which helps the principal offender to evade justice is embraced by the offence of accessory after the fact: R v Dileski at [8]. In R v Dileski, the applicant remained at the scene of the crime to ensure the murder went undetected. He also lied about the victim’s whereabouts when a friend came looking for him. However, it was an error to sentence the applicant for additional conduct which helped the principal obtain money from the victim’s bank account. See also, Ah Keni v R [2021] NSWCCA 263 where the applicant, over a 5 month period, attempted to conceal her husband and his associate’s involvement in the victim’s murder and also attempted to assist her husband to leave the jurisdiction. Subsequent conduct by an accessory beyond assistance to the principal, for example lying about his or her own involvement to police, may nevertheless be relevant to findings of remorse and contrition: R v Farroukh and Farroukh.

For offences under s 26 committed after 1 February 2003 there is a standard non-parole period of 10 years: item 2, Table of standard non-parole periods, s 54D(2), Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. Cases such as Bou-Antoun v R [2008] NSWCCA 1 and Benitez v R [2006] NSWCCA 21 have to be read in light of Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120. See Standard non-parole period offences — Pt 4 Div 1A at [7-890]ff.

Offences of attempted murder by various means are provided in ss 27, 28, 29 and 30 Crimes Act 1900.

Each form of attempted murder is liable to a maximum penalty of 25 years. The high maximum penalty reflects the obvious seriousness of the offence: R v Thew (unrep, 25/8/98, NSWCCA).

Where an offence under ss 27–30 is committed on or after 1 February 2003, a standard non-parole period of 10 years is prescribed: item 3, Table of standard non-parole periods, s 54D(2), Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.

The offender in R v Amati [2019] NSWCCA 193 pleaded guilty to three offences including two against s 27. In upholding a Crown appeal, the court observed that while caution is required in considering sentences imposed in s 27 cases, they remain useful given the relatively small number of such cases: at [87]–[89]. Examining other cases assisted the court to conclude the sentence was manifestly inadequate: see the discussion of those cases at [90]–[111].

Relevant objective factors include the skill and determination of the attempt, the motive, whether it was premeditated, the likelihood of death, and the injuries inflicted: R v Nguyen (unrep, 13/6/91, NSWCCA); R v McCaffrey; R v Rowsell [1999] NSWCCA 363 at [20]; R v Hynds (unrep, 4/6/91, NSWCCA); R v Rae [2001] NSWCCA 545 at [13].

The objective seriousness of an attempted murder may fall little short of the culpability for the completed crime: R v Macadam-Kellie [2001] NSWCCA 170 at [42] (two-judge bench).

In R v Rae the offender broke into the home of his former girlfriend, doused her in petrol, then set her alight. The sentencing judge described her injuries as “appalling” and her chances of a normal life “ruined forever”. On appeal, Sully J suggested the objective circumstances were within the worst category of crime (as that concept was understood prior to The Queen v Kilic (2016) 259 CLR 256). The court also affirmed the continual need to condemn violence stemming from the breakdown of domestic relationships. Sully J said at [21]:

To similar effect are observations in Vaughan v R [2020] NSWCCA 3, where the offender attacked his wife by knife and motor vehicle and also attacked a work colleague who came to her assistance. The court described the s 27 offence as a serious domestic violence offence stating the offender “sought to exercise control and domination over his wife as if he [was] … [entitled] to do so”: at [108].

It is important, where there are multiple s 27 offences, for the aggregate (or effective) sentence to properly recognise the principle of totality and the harm done to each victim. In R v Amati, the offender randomly attacked two people with an axe, inflicting significant injuries and then attacked another person, terrifying him but not inflicting any physical injury. The first two offences were found to be above the mid-range of objective seriousness. The offender had mental health issues associated with gender dysphoria and, after consuming alcohol and drugs, and in a fit of anger, went out intending to inflict violence on strangers. The court allowed a Crown appeal, concluding the aggregate sentence did not recognise the harm done to the first two victims: at [115]. The fact the offences occurred over a relatively short period of time did not assist the offender because there were three deliberate and separate attacks on different individuals who believed they were going to die, which was what the offender intended: at [112]. See also Vaughan v R at [110].

An offender acting as an accessory or principal in the second degree may not be as culpable as a principal, although much will depend on the circumstances of the offender’s involvement. In R v Doan [2003] NSWSC 345 at [10], the applicant’s conduct was described as “both minimal and reluctant”. In contrast, in R v AM [2001] NSWCCA 80 at [20], the applicant’s role in a contract killing was seen as crucial to carrying out the enterprise.

In the most serious attempted murder cases, the gravity of the crime may reduce the weight otherwise accorded to an offender’s subjective circumstances. For example in R v Rae [2001] NSWCCA 545, the injuries inflicted on the victim were so severe that the offender’s youth and absence of prior record carried less significance. Similarly, in R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 173 (a two-judge bench) prior good character carried little weight in light of the seriousness of the attempted murder. However, it was an error for the sentencing judge to ignore good character entirely: at [19].

Mental disorder suffered by an offender at the time of an attempted murder, including depression, may be a mitigating factor: R v Thew (unrep, 25/8/98, NSWCCA); R v Macadam-Kellie [2001] NSWCCA 170 at [62]; see also R v Cheatham [2002] NSWCCA 360 at [134]. Although in R v Amati, at [87] the court recognised it was not uncommon for s 27 offences to be committed by persons who were, at the time of the offending, experiencing significant mental health issues.

In circumstances where an offender would otherwise have been prosecuted for a less serious offence, but voluntarily discloses an intention to kill the victim, some measure of leniency is warranted: R v Bell [2005] NSWCCA 81 at [11]–[12].

In Davis v R [2015] NSWCCA 90, it was held that a pre-existing heart condition, which may have contributed to the death of the victim, was not a mitigating factor.

Given the serious and long-lasting injuries inflicted in many attempted murder cases, comparisons with more severe sentences imposed in cases involving death are generally unhelpful: R v Rae [2001] NSWCCA 545 at [19].

When sentencing an offender convicted of separate offences for both attempted murder and murder, the attempt may be relevant to assessing the culpability for murder, particularly in considering whether a life sentence is warranted under s 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999: Decision Restricted [2005] NSWCCA 4 at [93].